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COMMENT
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-REs JUDICAA-Application of Res
Judicata to Agencies with Parallel Jurisdiction
Umberfield v. School District 11, 522 P.2d 730 (Colo. 1974)
INTRODUCTION
Although the application of res judicata to administrative
agency determinations was once questioned,' it is now accepted
that under appropriate circumstances the doctrine may be used
in administrative law. It is, however, well settled that the doc-
trine may not be indiscriminately applied to administrative de-
terminations.' Before concluding that an agency decision is res
judicata, courts must consider not only the traditional criteria
applied to judicial decisions, i.e., identity of claims, parties, and
causes of action, 3 but also the theory, purpose, and intent of the
doctrine in light of the specific factual situation before the court.,
The Colorado Supreme Court in Umberfield v. School District 115
applied the doctrine of res judicata to the decision of a teacher
tenure panel, despite previous statements that "where public in-
terest may be adversely affected" prior administrative determi-
nations should not be binding.' The Colorado Civil Rights Com-
mission's (CCRC) jurisdiction over an alleged discriminatory dis-
missal of a tenured teacher was effectively denied by this deci-
sion.
The question of res judicata as it applies to two administra-
tive agencies having parallel jurisdiction has arisen infrequently
in case law. Accordingly, there are no well-established guidelines
to follow in determining the appropriateness of the doctrine's
application. Thus the rationale (or lack thereof) of Umberfield is
potentially applicable in other situations where administrative
agencies have overlapping jurisdiction. Reliance on the court's
reasoning may result in further unwarranted, and perhaps even
I K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 18.03 (3d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as
DAVIS].
2Id.
E.g., Liddell v. Smith, 345 F.2d 491 (7th Cir. 1965).
Pearson v. Williams, 202 U.S. 281 (1906); Churchill Tabernacle v. FCC, 160 F.2d
244, 246 (D.C. Cir. 1947). See generally note 14 infra and accompanying text.
522 P.2d 730 (Colo. 1974).
B & M Serv., Inc. v. PUC, 163 Colo. 228, 232, 429 P.2d 293, 295 (1967) (PUC decision
was not binding and could be changed).
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unintended, judicial limitation of agency jurisdiction. This com-
ment will examine the theory and rationale behind the applica-
tion of res judicata to administrative agency decisions. An analyt-
ical framework will be proposed which courts may use as a guide
in applying res judicata to decisions made by agencies with po-
tentially overlapping jurisdiction.
I. RES JUDICATA AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
A. The Doctrine of Res Judicata
Courts unhesitatingly apply res judicata to final judicial de-
cisions. As generally defined, res judicata means claim preclu-
sion-it prevents relitigation of all issues raised in the original
suit between two parties, or their privies, as well as all issues that
might properly have been raised.
Before the doctrine can be applied, three basic elements
must be present: identity of the claims upon which the two pro-
ceedings are based; identity of the parties or their privies; and a
final determination of the issues.' Inherent in these elements are
two other elements: that the matter deemed to have been conclu-
sively determined is within the jurisdiction of the body; and that
the body making the determination is independent and uninter-
ested. If any of these five elements are lacking, the original deci-
sion should not be held determinative of the later cause of action.9
B. Res Judicata and Administrative Agencies
1. Theory Behind Its Application
Although the trend is toward recognition of the doctrine in
administrative law, 0 many courts" and most authorities" have
I Umberfield v. School Dist. 11, 522 P.2d 730, 732 (Colo. 1974). See generally
RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS, Introductory Note §§ 41-72 (1942); Vestal, Extent of Claim
Preclusion, 54 IOWA L. REv. 1 (1968).
1 E.g., City & County of Denver v. Colorado Seminary, 96 Colo. 109, 41 P.2d 1109
(1934).
1 E.g., United States v. International Bldg. Co., 345 U.S. 502, 504-05 (1953) (where
subsequent action is based on a different claim the original proceeding operates as a bar
only for those issues actually heard and determined); Bankers Pocahontas Coal Co. v.
Burnet, 287 U.S. 308, 312 (1932) (res judicata requires identity of the parties); Gensinger
v. Commissioner, 208 F.2d 576, 579 (9th Cir. 1953) (jurisdiction lacking in the original Tax
Court proceeding); Sachs v. Ohio Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 148 F.2d 128, 132 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 326 U.S. 753 (1945) (an order which was not final, issued by an agency which
lacked jurisdiction, could not preclude redetermination of the issues).
IC United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 422 (1966); Fairmont
Aluminum Co. v. Commissioner, 222 F.2d 622, 627 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 838
(1955) (res judicata applies to agencies when exercising "judicial functions"); French v.
Rishell, 40 Cal. 2d 477, 254 P.2d 26 (1953); DAvis § 18.01. Compare McMahan v. Yeilding,
270 Ala. 504, 120 So. 2d 429 (1960) (ministerial actions are not res judicata).
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stressed the need for careful consideration of the unique processes
of administrative law 3 in applying the doctrine. It has been es-
tablished that res judicata will be considered a bar to collateral
attack of an agency decision only when the agency has been act-
ing in its quasi-judicial capacity." When the determination is
based on unchanged law and facts the doctrine has been most
strictly applied.' 5 The rationale behind limiting the application
of res judicata in this manner is that the doctrine is used in
administrative law for the same reasons that it is applied to judi-
cial determinations:" finality and judicial economy.
Case law 7 suggests that when the issue of res judicata arises
in respect to an administrative determination
" United States v. Stone Downer Co., 274 U.S. 225 (1927) (nature of Court of Cus-
toms precludes its finding from being res judicata); Pearson v. Williams, 202 U.S. 281
(1906) (initial hearing on alien exclusion too hasty to bar a future hearing on the same
question); United States v. Smith, 482 F.2d 1120, 1123 (8th Cir. 1973) (res judicata must
be flexibly applied to administrative decisions); Gordon County Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
446 F.2d 1335 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (NLRB finding that employee was not dismissed for racial
reasons did not bar a Title VII action since the NLRB examiner was primarily concerned
with union activities); Tipler v. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co., 443 F.2d 126 (6th Cir.
1971) (a Labor Relations Board decision on the issue of racial discrimination did not
preclude a subsequent consideration of this issue by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission); Grose v. Cohen, 406 F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1969) (when facts in administrative
determinations so require, the doctrine of res judicata should not be strictly applied); Lane
v. Railroad Retirement Bd., 185 F.2d 819 (6th Cir. 1950) (determination by the National
Railroad Adjustment Board concerning an employment relationship was not binding on
Railroad Retirement Board since two different statutes were involved); Sekov Corp. v.
United States, 139 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1943) (prior FTC determination did not bar a district
court redetermination of same issue).
2 E.g., 2 F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 503 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
COOPER]; DAVIS § 18.04.
'1 Schopflocher, The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Administrative Law, 1942 Wis. L.
REV. 1.
" United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394 (1966); Associated
Indus., Inc. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 487 F.2d 342, 350 n.10 (2d Cir. 1973); Tipler
v. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co., 443 F.2d 125 (6th Cir. 1971); Jet Air Freight v. Jet Air
Freight Delivery, Inc., 264 So. 2d 35 (Fla. Ct. App. 1972); Roman Cleanser Co. v. Murphy,
366 Mich. 351, 194 N.W.2d 704 (1972); Standard Auto Parts Co. v. Michigan Employment
Security Comm'n, 3 Mich. App. 81, 143 N.W.2d 135 (1966); Morin v. S.H. Valliere Co.,
113 N.H. 436, 309 A.2d 153 (1973); Walsh v. Pluess-Staufer, Inc., 67 Misc. 2d 855, 325
N.Y.S.2d 19 (Sup. Ct. 1971). See DAVIS §§ 18.02-.03. Res judicata does not apply to
decisions made when an administrative agency is acting in its rulemaking capacity.
" Stucky v. Weinberger, 488 F.2d 904, 911 (9th Cir. 1973); Painters Dist. Council 58
v. Edgewood Contracting Co., 416 F.2d 1081 (5th Cir. 1969) (all facts pertinent to second
action had been fully heard and decided in the initial proceeding); DAvis § 18.03, at 559.
11 Fairmont Aluminum Co. v. Commissioner, 222 F.2d 622 (4th Cir. 1955); Old Dutch
Milk Farms, Inc. v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees Local 584, 281 F. Supp. 971, 974
(E.D.N.Y. 1968); DAVIS § 18.03.
11 Cases cited note 11 supra.
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the decision [whether to apply the doctrine] depends upon a weigh-
ing of competing interests in light of all the factors involved in the
particular case."0
Administrative agencies are given the authority to investigate,
adjudicate, and legislate in specified areas based on the premise
that they will develop expertise in their fields. The decisionmak-
ers are generally selected for their knowledge within the areas of
agency jurisdiction. Their expertise justifies the deference given
to administrative agencies by courts, particularly when the
agency has been created to protect an individual's rights and to
enforce public policy."9
2. Three Contexts in Which Res Judicata May Apply
The question of whether to apply res judicata to an agency
decision arises in three basic contexts: what weight a court should
give to an agency decision in a subsequent proceeding; what effect
the original decision has if the same parties seek a rehearing
before the same agency; and what effect a prior administrative
decision has when a collateral attack is made to another agency
based upon the same factual circumstances.
The first of these situations arises when the consequences of
an agency decision are bypassed by a collateral attack on the
issue in court.20 Must the agency's decision be accorded the con-
clusive effect of a similar decision by a court of law? Courts have
answered this question affirmatively or negatively depending
upon the facts before them.2' When there has been reliance upon
" COOPER at 508.
" See generally Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974); Tipler v. E.I.
duPont deNemours & Co., 443 F.2d 125 (6th Cir. 1971); 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2401 (purpose of Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII).
I This situation frequently arises in EEOC Title VII cases. As a result of a recent
Supreme Court decision, a finding by the EEOC that a complainant has been dismissed
for cause does not preclude a collateral attack in court. The district court is not bound by
the factual findings or conclusions reached by the EEOC. In fact, the petitioner is entitled
to a trial de novo at the district court level on the issue of the alleged Title VII violation.
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
" United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394 (1966) (holding that prior
agency determination was final and binding on court based on the facts of the case);
Fairmont Aluminum Co. v. Commissioner, 222 F.2d 622 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
838 (1955) (applying res judicata to a prior Tax Court determination of liability); Old
Dutch Farms, Inc. v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees Local 584, 281 F. Supp. 971
(E.D.N.Y. 1968) (denying application of res judicata to administrative determination
when it appeared that there were significant facts that remained to be determined); Jet
Air Freight v. Jet Air Freight Delivery, Inc., 264 So. 2d 35 (Fla. Ct. App. 1972) (court
applied res judicata to a prior agency determination); EPPS Air Serv., Inc. v. Lampkin,
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the initial decision, or when the decision has provided the basis
for a third party's change in position, the courts appear more
ready to find the agency decision conclusive. However, when it is
apparent that all the facts were not considered by the agency,
2
or when the agency has exceeded it statutory authority,23 res judi-
cata will generally not be applied. Rather than allowing a collat-
eral attack, however, courts usually hold that the proper recourse
is an appeal of the agency decision.
2
1
Different factors must be considered when, as in the second
situation, what is sought is a rehearing before the same agency,
rather than a collateral attack in court. Rehearings by an agency
may be mandated by its organic statute or by the inherent nature
of the agency itself.25 The situation arises most often, however,
when there has been a change in facts or law, or when new facts
have been discovered.2 1 When facts change there is no real ques-
tion of res judicata, since the previous decision was based on
premises which are no longer valid. Similarly, when a statute
provides for redetermination of issues previously decided, there
is recognition by the legislature that the subject matter of the
agency's jurisdiction may require periodic reconsideration. Prob-
lems of conclusiveness of a prior decision do arise, however, when
the petitioner requests a rehearing based on some inadequacy in
the initial proceeding.2 If an agency's refusal to grant a rehearing
229 Ga. 792, 194 S.E.2d 437 (1972) (court did not accord prior agency decision finality
based on different issues raised in the two proceedings); Walsh v. Pluess-Staufer, Inc., 67
Misc. 2d 855, 325 N.Y.S.2d 19 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
E.g., Old Dutch Farms, Inc. v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees Local 584, 281 F.
Supp. 971 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
13 E.g., Flavell v. Department of Welfare, 144 Colo. 203, 355 P.2d 941 (1960).
21 E.g., Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Lightsey, 185 F.2d 167 (4th Cir. 1950).
An example of this is the ability of the FCC to review radio and television licenses
periodically. Churchill Tabernacle v. FCC, 160 F.2d 244 (D.C. Cir. 1947) (the court refused
to prevent agency rehearing on whether to approve a license previously granted).
21 Jason v. Summerfield, 214 F.2d 273 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 840 (1954)
(change in law); NLRB v. Baltimore Transit Co., 140 F.2d 51 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 321
U.S. 795 (1944) (previous agency inaction does not operate as a bar to a new action on
new facts even though the same parties were involved); B & M Serv., Inc. v. PUC, 163
Colo. 193, 429 P.2d 293 (1967) (previous grant of license not a bar to refusal to grant license
on the same factual situation presented in the first application); Metropolitan Dade
County Bd. of Comm'rs v. Rockmatt Corp., 231 So. 2d 41 (Fla. Ct. App. 1970) (court held
prior zoning determination res judicata in regard to subsequent attempt at rezoning hear-
ing, barring substantial change in circumstances); Canada v. Peake, Inc., 184 Neb. 52,
165 N.W.2d 587 (1969) (order of railway commission was not res judicata as to subsequent
application of same nature since issues presented for new application were not raised at
the previous determination).
2 E.g., Southland Indus., Inc. v. FCC, 99 F.2d 117, 121 (D.C. Cir. 1938) (there should
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is appealed, courts analyze the initial hearing in the same way
that a trial court decision is reviewed by an appellate court: the
court examines the significance of the alleged inadequacy and the
effect it may have had on the original decision. Unless the agency
decision has denied fundamental fairness, courts will generally
defer to an agency's grant or denial of a rehearing." The specific
standards of review provided for most agency decisions29 and the
expertise of administrative agencies justifies this deference by the
courts.
Cases presenting the question of res judicata have arisen with
some regularity in the two contexts described above. The applica-
bility of the doctrine to one of two agency determinations when
both agencies have heard and decided the issue based upon their
own statutorily-defined objectives has arisen infrequently. 0 It
was in this context, however, that the court in Umberfield consid-
ered and applied res judicata to the teacher tenure panel decision.
Where two agencies have had parallel jurisdiction, the poten-
tial conflict in decisionmaking ability has frequently been re-
solved by statutory interpretation,' informal agreements be-
tween the agencies themselves,32 or the court's reliance on proce-
dural or factual variations between the proceedings.33 If these
solutions prove unworkable, the court should carefully examine
all pertinent issues in order to reach the desired result and avoid
be a right to rehearing to enable the commission to correct errors or hear newly discovered
evidence).
" E.g., United States v. Pierce Auto Freight Lines, Inc., 327 U.S. 515, 535 (1946); ICC
v. Parker, 326 U.S. 60, 73 (1945).
2 E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-4-106(7) (1973).
'o The situations in which this issue may arise are limited. For example, areas of
concurrent state and federal jurisdiction include CCRC and EEOC, Social Security and
state welfare agencies, ICC and a state public service commission which also grants
licenses; concurrent jurisdiction between two federal agencies may arise between the
NLRB and EEOC, FTC and FDA, Railroad Retirement Board and National Railroad
Adjustment Board; concurrent jurisdiction between two state agencies exists between
state unemployment commission and CCRC, and now, the teacher tenure panel and the
CCRC.
1, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974); Tipler v. E.I. duPont deNe-
mours & Co., 443 F.2d 125 (6th Cir. 1971); Hutchings v. United States Indus., Inc., 428
F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1970); Lane v. Railroad Retirement Bd., 185 F.2d 819 (6th Cir. 1950).
32 For example, such agreements exist between the FTC and the FDA. See generally
Groner & Sternstein, Res Judicata in Federal Administrative Law, 39 IOWA L. REv. 300
(1954); Kleinfeld & Goding, Res Judicata and Two Coordinate Federal Agencies, 95 U.
PENN. L. REV. 388 (1947).
33 E.g., State Licensing Bd. for Healing Arts v. Alabama Bd. of Podiatry, 287 Ala.
132, 249 So. 2d 611 (1971) (record insufficient to determine if the issue between the two
boards was really identical).
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unwarranted intrusions upon agency jurisdiction. Since the court
found no informal agreements or significant procedural variations
in Umberfield, the failure to analyze fully the application of res
judicata to the facts in the case was particularly critical.
II. Umberfield v. School District 11
A. Case Facts and History
Umberfield, a tenured teacher in School District 11, joined
the World Wide Church of God in 1969. He requested leaves of
absence in October 1969 and in April 1970 to observe religious
holy days. Although the school board denied permission, Umber-
field was absent on the holy days.34 In April 1970 he was charged
with breach of contract and neglect of his teaching duties and the
school board initiated dismissal proceedings. 35 The teacher tenure
panel (the panel) recommended dismissal and the school board
acted thereon. In August 1970 Umberfield filed a complaint with
the CCRC, alleging that his dismissal was based on his religious
practices and thus violated the Colorado Antidiscrimination Act
of 1957 (Antidiscrimination Act).36
11 The record before the CCRC stated that Umberfield had offered to procure and pay
for a substitute teacher or to teach summer school without compensation, and that he did
provide detailed lesson plans to be used in his absence. Transcript of the Hearing before
the Comm'n at 15 (Sept. 24, 1971).
" COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-63-117(1)-(4) (1973) describes the procedure to be
followed: The board accepts the recommendation of any member that a teacher be dis-
missed. The teacher is notified and may request that a panel to review the recommenda-
tion be convened. The panel is composed of three lay individuals who are not affiliated
with the school district. The board selects one member, the teacher selects a second
member, and a third is chosen by the two who have already been selected.
Id. § 24-34-306(2). The question of religious discrimination was never considered
on its merits by any court of review. However, the CCRC did find as a result of its
investigation and hearing that Umberfield's dismissal violated the Antidiscrimination
Act, which forbids an employer to discharge any person who is otherwise qualified because
of his creed. The commission found that the school district interfered with the free exercise
of Umberfield's religion by forcing him to choose between continued employment and
observance of the tenets of his faith. Cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943). Furthermore, the CCRC found that such an infringement can only be justified by
a compelling state interest or business reason. Applying the standards used by the courts
in interpreting rights arising under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e [hereinafter cited as Title VII], and by the CCRC in rights arising under COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-34-301 to -308 (1973), an attempt at reasonable accomodation must
be made by the employer if it can be made without undue hardship. Moody v. Albemarle
Paper Co., 474 F.2d 134, 140 (4th Cir. 1973); Spurlock v. United Airlines, Inc., 475 F.2d
216 (10th Cir. 1972) (where job criteria are justified by "business necessity" they are
permissible); Claybaugh v. Pacific N.W. Bell Tel. Co., 355 F. Supp. 1 (D. Ore. 1973); cf.
Pillar of Fire v. Denver Urban Renewal Authority, 509 P.2d 1250 (Colo. 1973).
1975
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The CCRC found that the dismissal was in violation of the
Antidiscrimination Act. 7 The school district appealed the
CCRC's decision, alleging that the CCRC lacked jurisdiction over
Umberfield's complaint because of the panel's previous adjudica-
tion of the matter. The district court upheld the school district's
contention. On appeal the court of appeals reversed the district
court's finding that the CCRC lacked jurisdiction, but affirmed
the decision on the basis that the CCRC's findings were not sup-
ported by the evidence. 8 The Supreme Court of Colorado granted
certiorari "[p]rimarily to review the correctness of the Court of
Appeals ruling that the doctrine of res judicata did not apply.
139
B. The Court's Rationale
The Colorado Supreme Court held that the CCRC lacked
jurisdiction because the teacher tenure panel findings were res
judicata. They reasoned that since the court's broad scope of
review of a tenure panel decision 0 extended to all matters, the
'7 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-34-301 to -308 (1973).
38 "The findings of fact by the commission are conclusive upon the district court if
supported by substantial evidence." Colorado Civil Rights Comm'n v. State, 30 Colo.
App. 10, 17, 488 P.2d 83, 85 (1971). E.g., Colorado Civil Rights Comm'n v. Refrigerated
Foods, Inc., 515 P.2d 1137 (Colo. 1973); Texas Southerland Corp. v. Hogue, 30 Colo. App.
560, 497 P.2d 1275 (1972) (the requirement may be met by indirect evidence). Substantial
evidence requires affirmance of an agency determination of fact unless the weight of the
record as a whole "clearly precludes" the agency's decision. Inherent in the concept of
substantial evidence is a requirement for quantity as well as quality. The quality aspect
is satisfied when there is a residuum of legally admissible evidence sufficient to support
the agency's findings. Johnson v. Industrial Comm'n, 137 Colo. 591, 597, 328 P.2d 384,
387 (1958); Williams v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 136 Colo. 458, 464, 319 P.2d 1078, 1081
(1957). See also COOPER at 727.
3, 522 P.2d at 732.
Id. at 733. A panel hearing is subject to review as statutorily provided.
If [the district court] finds that the agency action is arbitrary or capricious,
a denial of statutory right, contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege
or immunity. . . then the court shall hold unlawful and set aside the agency
action . . . .In all cases under review, the court shall determine all ques-
tions of law and interpret the statutory and constitutional provisions in-
volved and shall apply such interpretations to the facts duly found or estab-
lished.
Id. § 24-4-106(7). The statutory standard which the court applies is "clearly erroneous
on the whole record, unsupported by substantial evidence when the record is considered
as a whole .... " Id. (emphasis added). As defined by the court in United States v.
United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948), "clearly erroneous" is a finding that
leaves the reviewing court "with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed." "Policy, authority and history all thus show that the 'clearly erroneous' rule
gives the reviewing court broader powers than the 'substantial evidence' formula." Stem,
Review of Findings of Administrators, Judges and Juries: A Comparative Analysis, 58
HARV. L. REV. 70, 88-89 (1944). See also COOPER at 726. Note that the 1969 amendment to
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panel itself had authority to consider violations of statutory or
constitutional rights.4 Although the grounds for dismissal which
are specified in the Teacher Employment, Dismissal, and Tenure
Act of 1967 (Teacher Tenure Act)4" make no mention of statutory
or constitutional rights, the court argued that the scope of review
defined the panel's jurisdiction. It was the court's contention that
Umberfield actually presented his complaint of discrimination to
the panel when he alleged a violation of his constitutional rights,
and that the panel rejected it." (The court stated that he could
have, but did not, allege violation of the Antidiscrimination Act).
The court reasoned that if it failed to accord finality to the panel's
decision and allowed the CCRC to hear the question of a discrimi-
natory practice, the court might be "compelled to affirm opposite
results of the two administrative bodies." 44
To support its contention that res judicata may be applied
to an administrative determination, the court cited United States
v. Utah Construction & Mining Co.45 Although the Supreme
Court in that case made the general statement that res judicata
may apply to administrative agencies when they have resolved
"disputed issues of fact properly before [them] which the parties
have had an adequate opportunity to litigate . . .," the facts in
the case were much stronger. The parties had contractually
agreed that the determinations were to be final.47 By simplisti-
cally adopting the Supreme Court's general statement, the Colo-
rado court failed to consider whether the requisite elements for a
finding of res judicata were present in Umberfield.
Of the five elements necessary for a proper application of res
judicata, only two, the identity of the parties before both the
panel and the CCRC, and the finality of the panel's decision, were
clear. The identity of claims, the jurisdiction of the panel to de-
the Colorado Administrative Procedure Act provides for both standards of review. The
court has not, as yet, interpreted these two standards together.
41 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-63-116 (1973) provides that a tenured teacher may be
dismissed for "physical or mental disability, incompetency, neglect of duty, immorality,
conviction of a felony, insubordination, or other good and just cause ....
42 Id.
41 At the CCRC hearing Umberfield stipulated that he had alleged at the panel
hearing that the school board's action was in "[v]iolation of the rights guaranteed all
citizens, including the teacher, under the Constitution of the United States and the State
of Colorado. ... 522 P.2d at 734.
44 Id.
" 522 P.2d at 732, citing 384 U.S. 394 (1966).
48 384 U.S. at 422.
' Id. at 419.
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termine a violation of the Antidiscrimination Act or of the Consti-
tution, and the determination by an independent board were only
questionably present.
To support a finding of res judicata, the same claim must
provide the basis for both actions.48
In deciding whether the substances of two actions are for res
judicata purposes the same, various tests have been advanced: Is the
same right infringed by the same wrong? Would a different judg-
ment obtained in the second action impair rights under the first
judgment? Would the same evidence sustain both judgments?"
Since these guidelines are directed at judicial rather than admin-
istrative determinations, they should be liberally interpreted and
applied2 ° In Umberfield two distinct rights arising under two
different statutes provided the bases for the claims. A finding of
discrimination, or lack thereof, by the CCRC would not impair
Umberfield's rights before the panel. However, due to the man-
date against discrimination, if there were a finding that Umber-
field's rights under the Antidiscrimination Act had been violated,
this might impair the school board's ability to effectuate a dis-
missal.
Likewise, although the evidence necessary to both actions
arose out of the same transaction, arguably different evidence is
relevant to meet the statutory criteria of the Teacher Tenure Act 1
and the Antidiscrimination Act.5" Thus the requirement that both
causes of action arose from the same claim should not have been
so quickly dismissed by the court. Even if the court had found
that the complaint before the CCRC and the action by the panel
were based on the same claim, the question of jurisdiction was not
effectively resolved by the court. As a defense for his absences
from school Umberfield may have presented the infringement of
his free exercise of religion. This did not, however, give the panel
direct jurisdiction to make a final determination of the constitu-
tional violation,' 3 much less a violation of another state statute.
" See, e.g., United States v. International Bldg. Co., 345 U.S. 502 (1953).
" Acree v. Air Line Pilots Assoc., 390 F.2d 199, 201 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
852 (1968). See also RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS §§ 61-67 (1942).
See generally DAvis § 18.03.
" COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-63-116 (1973).
12 See note 116 infra for the text of the Act.
3 RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 71 (1942):
Where a court has incidentally determined a matter which it would have
had no jurisdiction to determine in an action brought directly to determine
VOL. 52
ADMINISTRATIVE LA W-RES JUDICA TA
Direct jurisdiction to make final determinations of legal and fac-
tual issues may not be conferred by incorporating by reference a
general procedural statute.
Not only did the panel lack direct jurisdiction, but the final
decision to dismiss Umberfield was not made by an uninterested
body, as the doctrine of res judicata requires. The school board
makes the final decision to terminate a tenured teacher's employ-
ment. 54 Thus the court found that a decision by an interested
party was res judicata, thereby preventing a determination of a
statutory violation by an independent, statutorily-created
agency.
In the CCRC the legislature has created an agency with ex-
pertise in discriminatory employment practices. However, the
court's rationale effectively weakened the CCRC by limiting its
ability to hold a hearing on the alleged discriminatory dismissal.
If, as the court suggested, the scope of review5 expands the juris-
diction of the agency, all agencies would have authority to decide
violations of any constitutional or statutory rights.5" Conse-
quently, there would be no need for the CCRC. Inasmuch as the
legislature did create an agency with specific jurisdiction over
discriminatory employment practices, it is reasonable that the
CCRC, and not other agencies, should be allowed to make final
determinations of discrimination.
The court in Umberfield ignored not only the expertise of the
CCRC and the legislative intent expressed in its creation, but also
the absence of several elements required for the application of res
judicata. Even if the court had determined that all necessary
elements were present for finding the panel decision res judicata,
it, the judgment is not conclusive in a subsequent action brought to deter-
mine the matter directly.
Similarly, the Colorado Court of Appeals in School District v. Howell, 517 P.2d 422 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1973), held that the CCRC could not determine violations of constitutional
rights. The scope of the CCRC's jurisdiction was specifically limited to determining viola-
tions of its own organic statute. If the court's logic in Umberfield were extended, then
Umberfield would overrule Howell. Since the CCRC is also subject to the Administrative
Procedure Act's standards of review, it too would have jurisdiction to make determina-
tions of constitutional violations.
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-63-117(10) (1973).
5 Id. § 24-4-106(7). The Administrative Procedure Act defines the scope of review for
all administrative agency decisions except those exempted by provisions of individual
statutes. Id. § 24-4-107.
" The Administrative Procedure Act is purely a procedural statute and was not
intended to be a source of agency jurisdiction. Jurisdiction of an agency is determined
solely by the organic statute of that agency.
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there are other factors which must be considered before the doc-
trine can be applied to an administrative decision.
III. AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR DETERMINING THE
APPLICABILITY OF RES JUDICATA
Under the case law dealing with the application of res judi-
cata to administrative agencies57 it is clear that this doctrine is
not a simplistic concept, but one in which issues other than the
basic definitional elements must be considered. It is a complex
doctrine when applied to administrative determinations, and
must be applied differently in different contexts. Although courts
have generally dealt with one, or at most two, of these issues in
any case, each issue is important and should be considered by the
court in all instances.
A. An Overview of the Proposed Analysis
A functional breakdown of the case law suggests that there
are four basic issues which a court must analyze (in addition to
the five elements discussed earlier) 8 when considering the appli-
cation of res judicata to administrative agency decisions: (1) elec-
tion of remedies; (2) primary jurisdiction; (3) exhaustion of reme-
dies; (4) public policy considerations.59 Although these issues
have usually arisen in contexts where a rehearing before the same
agency is sought or a collateral attack of an agency decision is
made in court, they are equally relevant to the situation in which
two administrative agencies have parallel jurisdiction, as in
Umberfield. Because any of these issues can constitute sufficient
grounds for refusal to apply res judicata to an administrative
decision, it is not usually necessary for a court to consider all of
them. But if one or more considerations appears to support appli-
cation of the doctrine, the court should carefully examine each of
the remaining issues. For example, even if there has been an
election of remedies, there may be important public policy con-
siderations or questions of primary jurisdiction which may pre-
clude use of the doctrine.
The relative weight of each of the four issues will vary with
the facts of the particular case. When an agency decision is collat-
7 See text accompanying notes 10-19 supra.
See text accompanying notes 7-9 supra.
' No one case was found which discussed all these issues. See the detailed discussion
accompanying notes 60-118 infra, for cases dealing with each issue.
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erally attacked in court, for example, the questions of election
and exhaustion of remedies are probably the most important and
should be considered first. However, when two agencies have par-
allel jurisdiction, as in Umberfield, and a party attempts to es-
tablish that only one of those agencies may hear and decide an
issue, the questions of election of remedies, primary jurisdiction,
and, sometimes, public policy should be given the greatest
weight.
In Umberfield the Colorado Supreme Court completely
failed to recognize the complex nature of the doctrine. They took
a simplistic definition0 and applied it uncritically to the tenure
panel decision. Had the court considered all the relevant factors,
the inappropriateness of applying res judicata to the facts of this
case would have been apparent.
B. Elements of the Analytical Framework
1. Election of Remedies
When a court is faced with a situation where a party has two
or more potential avenues of relief available, the issue of election
of remedies must be explored."' In Umberfield there was no real
election made since the panel hearing preceded Umberfield's dis-
missal and the dismissal itself provided the basis for his com-
plaint to the CCRC. The issue, however, was still pertinent, since
'the court proceeded as if Umberfield's pursuit of his right to a
hearing before the panel resulted in a choice of forums. The court
held that he was estopped from seeking alternative relief when
the panel action resulted in his dismissal by the board."
In Colorado, courts have traditionally been reluctant to im-
pose an election of remedies on a party unless directly inconsist-
ent positions must be taken to avail oneself of both remedies.,3
The principal limitation on the pursuit of concurrent remedies is
that a party is entitled to only one satisfaction. 4 In conjunction
s0 522 P.2d at 732.
, Election of remedies is often used by courts to include election of forums. Alexander
v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974). Thus, although there was no possibility of
duplicate relief being awarded, nor any real election of remedies made in Umberfield, the
term as used throughout this section incorporates election of forums.
11 522 P.2d at 734.
Louis Cook Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. Frank Briscoe Co., 445 F.2d 1177, 1179
(10th Cir. 1971); Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 82, 388 P.2d 399, 401 (1964);
Holscher v. Ferry, 131 Colo. 190, 193, 280 P.2d 655, 657 (1955); Thornburg v. Homestead
Minerals Corp., 513 P.2d 219, 220 (Colo. App. 1973).
" Marean v. Stanley, 5 Colo. App. 335, 338, 58 P. 395, 396 (1894).
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with the contract claims actually made before the tenure panel
in Umberfield, it would not have been inconsistent to allege a
violation of the Antidiscrimination Act. 5 Nor was there any pos-
sibility of duplicate relief being sought, since Umberfield did not
file a complaint with the CCRC until after the panel had met, the
school board had acted, and he had been dismissed.
In Umberfield the court was faced with a situation that is
directly analogous to cases that have arisen alleging violations of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII)66 and labor agreements or
the National Labor Relations Act. 7 Labor arbitration agreements
and the National Labor Relations Act provide for arbitration of
labor disputes by a board of arbitrators chosen specifically to deal
with the complaint. If the complainant also alleges that a dis-
criminatory employment practice has occurred, there is an addi-
tional remedy provided by Title VII.
Title VII 8 is the federal counterpart to the Antidiscrimi-
nation Act."8 They are both designed to
eliminate, through the utilization of formal and informal remedial
procedures, discrimination in employment based on race, color, reli-
gion, or national origin. The title authorizes the establishment of a
Federal Equal Opportunity Commission and delegates to it the pri-
mary responsibility for preventing and eliminating unlawful em-
ployment practices .... 70
Thus, cbmparison of Umberfield with cases arising where resort
to arbitration has preceded or accompanied a Title VII action is
" COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-34-301 to -308 (1973).
O 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970). Although most of the cases arising under Title VII deal
with racial discrimination, the language of its provisions also forbids discrimination on
the basis of religion. The wording of the Antidiscrimination Act and Title VII in these
sections is nearly identical, so the comparison of these cases with Umberfield is appropri-
ate. However, the procedure embodied in COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-34-305 to -308
(1973) and that in Title VII differ in how allegations of discrimination are dealt with.
Under the Colorado Act, the CCRC conducts an investigation and hearing and
reaches a final determination of the substance of the allegation. Its findings are reviewable
by a district court. However, according to the provisions of Title VII, the EEOC conducts
an investigation and determines the validity of the complaint. It then attempts by infor-
mal means to resolve the problem. If this attempt is unsuccessful, it notifies the complain-
ant of its findings and authorizes him to seek judicial relief. Under the 1972 amendment
the EEOC itself may pursue a judicial hearing on the question. Therefore, under Title VII,
the court makes the final determination, enforceable by law, as to the existence of any
discrimination, whereas in Colorado the CCRC is empowered, based upon its own deci-
sion, to grant appropriate relief.
11 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970).
8 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970).
6 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-34-301 to -308 (1973).
1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2401; see COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-34-301
to -308 (1973).
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appropriate, since both Title VII and the Antidiscrimination Act
address similar problems.
The Teacher Tenure Act provides for the convening of a ten-
ure panel at the teacher's request to conduct a hearing concerning
any proposed dismissal of a tenured teacher. Its composition and
functions are defined by statute.71 The panel evaluates, in light
of the Teacher Tenure Act72 and the teacher's contract, the valid-
ity of the complaint on which the recommendation for dismissal
is based. The statute defines the grounds for dismissal and pro-
vides the framework in which the panel operates. Similarly, the
role of the arbitrator or an arbitration board
is to carry out the aims of the agreement that [it] has been commis-
sioned to interpret and apply, and [its] role defines the scope of
[itsl authority."
The rights arising under both Title VII and the Antidiscrimi-
nation Act, however, are distinct and separate from the rights
guaranteed by an employment contract or the Teacher Tenure
Act. The courts have stressed the distinction between the rights
arising under a labor arbitration agreement and those arising
under Title VII, refusing to apply an election of remedies to Title
VII cases. 4 This same distinction between the rights arising
under the Teacher Tenure Act and those protected by the Anti-
discrimination Act was ignored by the Colorado court in
Um berfield.
In a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision, Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver,7" it was held that the doctrine of election of
remedies is inapplicable when there are statutory rights distinctly
separate from the employee's contract rights. Prior to Gardner-
Denver, courts had limited an arbitrator's authority to determin-
ing the existence of any contract violations; he had no authority
to make a conclusive determination of any other statutory rights
that may have been violated." Courts reasoned that the funda-
mental nature of the rights protected by Title VII 7 militates
" COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-63-117(5)-(9) (1973).
72 Id. §§ 22-63-101 to -118.
11 Hutchings v. United States Indus., Inc., 428 F.2d 303, 312 (5th Cir. 1970).
1, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974); Tipler v. E.I. duPont deNe-
mours & Co., 443 F.2d 125 (6th Cir. 1971).
75 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
71 Tipler v. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co., 443 F.2d 125 (6th Cir. 1971); Hutchings
v. United States Indus., Inc., 428 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1970).
71 See generally 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2401.
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against use of any body, other than the one specially created, to
make a final finding of discriminatory employment practices.78
The Teacher Tenure Act was designed to prevent arbitrary dis-
missals of tenured teachers,79 and similarly most labor agree-
ments are designed to protect both the employer's and employee's
rights and interests in the employment relationship, and to pre-
vent unjustified, capricious actions on the part of either party.
The Supreme Court found that the fact that a violation of one's
civil rights and contract rights arose from the same incident did
not erase the distinction between those two rights. In allowing
Alexander to pursue both remedies, the Court found the relation-
ship between the forums to be complementary rather than incon-
sistent. 0 Since the rights protected by the Antidiscrimination
Act l are identical with those the court found in Gardner-Denver2
to be distinct and separate from the rights guaranteed in the
arbitration agreement, the analogy seems compelling.
In failing to follow the lead of the U.S. Supreme Court, the
Colorado court constructively imposed an election of remedies on
Umberfield by precluding his complaint to the CCRC. By so
doing, it failed to give any weight either to its traditional
reluctance to impose such a harsh doctrine or to the importance
of safeguarding those rights protected by the Antidiscrimination
Act.83
2. Primary Jurisdiction
In failing to allow the CCRC to investigate claims directly
within its competence, the Colorado court ignored a fundamental
tenet of administrative law, primary jurisdiction. The court
argued that if it recognized the CCRC's jurisdiction over the dis-
missal, affirmation of two conflicting agency decisions might be
required. They justified their holding that the tenure panel deci-
sion was res judicata on the issue of religious discrimination on
the basis of this potential conflict. 4
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction provides that when
there is concurrent jurisdiction between an administrative agency
7, Cases cited note 76 supra.
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-63-111 to -116 (1973).
415 U.S. 36 (1974).
s' COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-34-301 to -308 (1973).
.2 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
'3 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-34-301 to -308 (1973).
522 P.2d at 734.
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and a court, the court should defer factual determinations to the
agency. This deference is based on the supposed expertise of the
agency and the need for uniform interpretation of statutory provi-
sions that can only be afforded when one body hears all cases that
arise thereunder.15 It has been suggested that this concept could
be applied in modified form to two administrative agencies with
concurrent jurisdiction."
Under the doctrine of "primary jurisdiction," even if the is-
sues raised in the first proceeding were arguably within the juris-
diction of that agency but another agency had been created with
specific jurisdiction over those issues, it would be the second
agency whose jurisdiction would be recognized. If this concept
had been accepted by the court there would have been no poten-
tial conflict. Because the two agencies involved in Umberfield
have distinct functions and because only the CCRC has explicit
jurisdiction and expertise in discriminatory employment prac-
tices, it, and not the tenure panel, should be authorized to make
a final determination of any discriminatory acts.
3. Exhaustion of Remedies
The question of exhaustion of remedies, like those of jurisdic-
tion and scope of authority discussed below, involves statutory
construction and consideration of legislative intent. The issue
which a court must decide is whether all remedies that are pro-
vided in the statute have been, or must be, exhausted 8 before an
appeal can be taken or a collateral attack made. The rationale
behind the application of exhaustion of remedies to an adminis-
trative decision is threefold:
11 G & A Contractors, Inc. v. Alaska Greenhouses, Inc., 517 P.2d 1379 (Alas. 1974).
See generally Note, Developments in the Law-Res Judicata, 65 HARv. L. REv. 818 (1952).
86 Editorial Note, Res Judicata and Administrative Jurisdiction-A Proposal for Re-
solving Conflicts Between Agencies with Overlapping Jurisdiction, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
1056, 1063 (1967). The note suggests that an interlocutory appeal provision be incorpo-
rated into the APA providing for a determination of proper jurisdiction. A court would
determine, based on the issue in controversy, which agency would have jurisdiction to hear
and decide the controversy. This decision would then be subject to judicial review under
APA provisions.
87 Denver-Laramie-Walden Truck Line, Inc. v. Denver-Ft. Collins Freight Serv., Inc.,
156 Colo. 366, 370, 399 P.2d 242, 243 (1965) (failure to follow statutory provisions requiring
appeal to agency barred pursuit of judicial relief); Hannum v. Hillyard, 131 Colo. 37, 41,
278 P.2d 1015, 1017 (1955) (failure to take advantage of appeal provided for in statute
prevented court action); Florida Welding & Erection Serv., Inc. v. American Mut. Ins.
Co., 285 So. 2d 386, 389-90 (Fla. 1973) (where statutory provisions provide for appeal of




(1) judicial review may be facilitated by allowing the appropriate
agency to develop a factual record and apply its expertise, (2) judi-
cial time may be conserved because the agency might grant the
relief sought, and (3) administrative autonomy requires that an
agency be given opportunity to correct its own errors.M
Exhaustion of remedies is used by the courts in two contexts.
Courts may require that all administrative remedies within an
agency be exhausted prior to granting an appeal of the agency
decision.89 Similarly when an administrative determination is at-
tacked in a different forum, courts may refuse to recognize the
validity of the challenge if the initial decision was not judicially
appealed. 0 However, courts have held that when fundamental
rights protected by a statute are involved, failure to appeal an
agency decision will not always bar a collateral attack.'
Umberfield failed to take advantage of the appeal provision
in the Teacher Tenure Act." The court, by implication, based its
determination that the panel decision was res judicata on this
0 United States ex rel. Marroro v. Warden, 483 F.2d 656, 659 (3d Cir. 1973), rev'd
on other grounds, 417 U.S. 653 (1974), citing McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 194-
95 (1969).
11 E.g., James v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d 566, 570 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding that under
New York law, state administrative remedies must always be exhausted before appeals
may be taken to federal court, but not always before appeals to state court); Jackson v.
Colorado, 294 F. Supp. 1065, 1071 (D. Colo. 1968) (where there was a requirement that
all administrative remedies be exhausted prior to asking for an injunction, there was no
final record or clear knowledge that the petitioners fell within the agency requirements
without exhausting the agency remedies); Moschetti v. Liquor Licensing Authority, 176
Colo. 281, 301, 490 P.2d 299, 301 (1971) (prior to judicial appeal all administrative reme-
dies must be exhausted (dictum)); Denver-Laramie-Walden Truck Lines, Inc. v. Denver-
Ft. Collins Freight Serv., Inc., 156 Colo. 366, 370, 399 P.2d 242, 243 (1965); Hannum v.
Hillyard, 131 Colo. 37, 41, 278 P.2d 1015, 1017 (1955).
10 Egner v. Texas City Indep. School Dist., 338 F. Supp. 931, 934 (S.D. Tex. 1972)
(where available state judicial and administrative remedies exist, a collateral attack in
federal court may not be made).
" See Russo v. Central School Dist., 469 F.2d 623, 628 n.5 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
411 U.S. 932 (1973) (court stated that exhaustion of state judicial remedies is not a
prerequisite for federal court jurisdiction under the Civil Rights Act of 1871 section 1983,
particularly since the teacher was dismissed for exercising first amendment rights); James
v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d 566, 570 (2d Cir. 1972) (administrative remedies, but not
appeals to the state court, must be exhausted prior to collateral attack on dismissal);
Wishart v. McDonald, 367 F. Supp. 530, 533 (D. Mass. 1973) (teacher's failure to seek
judicial review of an administrative decision upholding his dismissal did not bar section
1983 action). Similarly many courts have held that exhaustion of state administrative
remedies may not be required when violation of fundamental rights protected by section
1983 is an issue. E.g., McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 671 (1963); Webb v. Lake
Mills Community School Dist., 344 F. Supp. 791, 806 (N.D. Iowa 1972).
92 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-63-117(11) (1973).
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failure to appeal. 3 Thus they relied on the premise that all judi-
cial appeals must be exhausted before the validitiy of a collateral
attack may be recognized. The logic supporting this application
of exhaustion of remedies is, however, less compelling when the
question presented, as in Umberfield, is whether failure to ex-
haust remedies arising under one statute precludes the assertion
of a separate, independent right arising under another statute.
Exhaustion of remedies arising under one issue will not necessar-
ily have any effect on the others. In light of the legislative intent
expressed in the creation of the CCRC, there are overriding prin-
ciples which suggest that failure to exhaust remedies in the pres-
ent case should not operate as a bar to the CCRC's jurisdiction. 4
Moreover, the lack of factual determinations by the panel on the
issue of religious discrimination, and the total inadequacy of the
record, provided no real basis to support an appeal of the deci-
sion.9 5 Furthermore, if the agency decision had been appealed, the
court might have referred the issue of a discriminatory employ-
ment practice to the CCRC under the doctrine of primary juris-
diction. Indeed, such a course might have resulted in a situation
identical to the one which the court faced when it granted certior-
ari: a tenure panel finding justifying the dismissal on the basis
of a requirement in the Teacher Tenure Act" and a CCRC deci-
sion finding that the dismissal violated the Antidiscrimination
Act.97
4. Public Policy Considerations
Before a court applies res judicata to an administrative deci-
sion, it should examine the language and legislative history of the
statute creating the agency to determine the legislative intent. In
Umberfield the court did examine the statutes which created the
522 P.2d at 734.
,4 Cases cited note 91 supra.
, In Umberfield, the petitioner's brief noted that no record of the panel hearing had
been presented to either the CCRC or to the federal district court when the school district
appealed the CCRC's decision. A court, when asked to review an agency decision that is
insufficiently supported by the record, has two possible courses of action: it can either
make an independent determination of the facts, or it can remand the case to the agency
for a redetermination and compilation of a complete record on which its decision has been
based. The latter course of action is the one recognized by Colorado and many other states.
Neverdahl v. Linder, 141 Colo. 186, 347 P.2d 512 (1959). Accord, e.g., Rock Island Metal
Foundry, Inc. v. City of Rock Island, 414 Ill. 436, 111 N.E.2d 499 (1953); Moore's Case,
330 Mass. 1, 110 N.E.2d 764 (1953); Reinauer Realty Corp. v. Borough of Paramas, 34
N.J. 406, 169 A.2d 814 (1961); Hooper v. Goldstein, 104 R.I. 132, 241 A.2d 809 (1968).
, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-63-116 (1973).
'7 Id. § 24-34-307(12).
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CCRC and the tenure panel,9" but without the aid of any articu-
lated constructional guides.
a. Canons of Construction
The basic canons of construction are often used as an aid in
interpreting language used by the legislature so that effect may
be given to the expressed and implied intent of that body. In
Umberfield the court strictly construed the Antidiscrimination
Act99 and liberally interpreted those sections of the Teacher Ten-
ure Act which deal with a teacher tenure panel.100 This anomalous
procedure resulted in a judicial expansion of the panel's jurisdic-
tion beyond both the express and implied intent of the legisla-
ture, and a contraction of the CCRC's jurisdiction, which frus-
trated and prevented action by the CCRC.
Administrative agencies are "creatures of statute" and have
only that authority explicitly or implicitly conferred upon them
by the legislature in their organic statutes. 1 1 While the jurisdic-
tion of the agencies has been subject to judicial clarification in
several areas where questions have arisen, the directives in the
statutes, as construed in light of the legislative intent, should
provide the controlling interpretation. Colorado courts have re-
peatedly asserted that they
should confine themselves to the construction of a statute as it is
written and not attempt to supply omissions or otherwise amend or
change the law under the guise of construction.
The fundamental rule of construction is that the court shall
ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature, as ex-
pressed in the statute.12
The problem in Umberfield, however, is that two statutes must
be interpreted in such a way that effect is given to the legislative
intent of each of them.
11 520 P.2d at 733, citing COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 80-21-3,-5 (Supp. 1969); COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 123-18-17 (Supp. 1967). These sections are currently codified as COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-34-303, -305 (1973); id. § 22-63-117.
gg Id. §§ 24-34-301 to -308.
"o Id. § 22-63-117.
Courtney v. Island Creek Coal Co., 474 F.2d 468, 472 (6th Cir. 1973); Civil Serv.
Comm'n v. Pitlock, 44 Mich. App. 410, 205 N.W.2d 293 (1973); City of Pittsburgh v. Milk
Mktg. Bd., 7 Pa. Comwlth. 180, 299 A.2d 197 (1973); Mountaineer Disposal Serv., Inc. v.
Dyer, 197 S.E.2d 111 (W. Va. 1973).
10 83 Christner v. Poudre Valley Cooperative Ass'n., 235 F.2d 946, 950 (10th Cir.
1956) (footnotes omitted); United States v. Colorado & N.W.R.R., 157 F. 321, 323 (8th
Cir. 1907), cert. denied, 209 U.S. 544 (1908); Johnston v. Ctiy Council, 117 Colo. 223, 228,
493 P.2d 651, 654 (1972); St. Luke's Hosp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 142 Colo. 28, 349 P.2d
995 (1960).
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b. Legislative Intent
1. The Colorado Civil Rights Commission
A careful examination of the functions and authority of the
CCRC reveals the broad legislative intent behind the creation of
that agency.103 The Colorado legislature created a statewide
agency with expertise in the field of discrimination. This exper-
tise of the CCRC is derived from the lay and professional commis-
sioners who compose the commission. During their 4-year term,
they acquire knowledge and skill in the area of discriminatory
employment practices.
Due to its experience and the limited area of its jurisdiction,
the CCRC has developed uniform standards to test an employer's
compliance with the law prohibiting discrimination in employ-
ment. These standards are one of the tools used by the CCRC to
reach its decisions. The court's decision in Umberfield now raises
the question of the feasibility of maintaining a uniform statutory
application of the Antidiscrimination Act if any agency could
make a final determination, subject only to judicial review, that
the provisions of that statute have or have not been violated. ,04 If
this view prevails, the benefit of having a specialized commission
whose function it is to interpret and apply the statute would be
lost. Although most of the questions presented to courts have
arisen in connection with limitations of the CCRC's jurisdiction,
these limitations have effectively abrogated much of the legisla-
tive intent evident in the Commission's creation.105 The observa-
tion was made in 1969 that
[u]nder the statutes only the Civil Rights Commission can make
the determination of whether an unlawful act of discrimination has
occurred and the findings of the commission are binding on the court
so long as they are supported by adequate evidence.'0
,03 See generally text accompanying note 70 supra.
1* See text accompanying notes 84-86 supra.
05 State v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm'n, 521 P.2d 908 (Colo. 1974) (the court held
that the CCRC lacked jurisdiction over a civil service employee); Colorado Antidiscrimi-
nation Comm'n v. Continental Air Lines, 149 Colo. 259, 368 P.2d 970 (1962), rev'd, 372
U.S. 714 (1963) (the Colorado Supreme Court held that the CCRC could not regulate
hiring practices of an interstate air carrier because this was a matter reserved to the
federal government); Colorado Civil Rights Comm'n v. State, 30 Colo. App. 10, 488 P.2d
83 (1971) (CCRC has jurisdiction over constructive discharge); State v. Adolph Coors
Corp., 29 Colo. App. 240, 486 P.2d 43 (1971) (the court found a commissioner's complaint
insufficient to justify issuance of a subpoena).
101 Penwell, Civil Rights in Colorado, 46 DENVER L.J. 181, 207 (1969).
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The continued validity of this observation in light of recent deci-
sions is questionable.
2. The Teacher Tenure Panel
While the panel was created to review recommendations of
dismissal and to comply with the principles of a right to a hearing
prior to dismissal, 07 it functions only as a fact-finding body and
may not dismiss the teacher itself. Dismissal is a function of the
board of education.1
8
The panel is an ad hoc body whose members are chosen each
time a dismissal action is pending before a board of education.
Due to the selection process, °9 it is unlikely that any two panels
would be composed of the same members. The panel serves a
function analogous to that of an arbitration board whose powers
and duties are prescribed by the employment contract, or in the
case of the panel, the statute which it is interpreting."0 This
role of interpreting and applying the statute to the facts should
define the scope of the board's authority. It has been held in other
states that similarly constituted boards, with functions analogous
to the Colorado panel, are limited by the specific grants of power
which they have been given."'
The Colorado statute lists the specific grounds which justify
dismissal of a tenured teacher."2 Instead of confining the panel's
scope of inquiry to the statutory standards, the court in
Umberfield has increased the jurisdiction of the lay panel, includ-
ing within its purview questions of fundamental statutory and
constitutional rights."' The mere availability of judicial review
which can include consideration of any statutory or constitutional
rights"' does not create jurisdiction in the original agency to con-
sider and determine such questions.
"I Case law holds that prior to dismissal a tenured teacher is entitled to notice and a
hearing of the charges. See School Dist. No. 13 v. Mort, 115 Colo. 571, 176 P.2d 984 (1947);
School Dist. No. 1 v. Parker, 82 Colo. 385, 260 P. 521 (1927); School Dist. No. 25 v.
Youberg, 77 Colo. 202, 235 P. 351 (1925); School Dist. No. 2 v. Shuck, 49 Colo. 526, 113
P. 311 (1911). See also COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-63-117 (1973).
108 School Dist. No. 50 v. Witthaus, 30 Colo. App. 41, 490 P.2d 315 (1971).
109 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-63-117(5) (1973).
10 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974); Tipler v. E.I. duPont deNe-
mours Co., 443 F.2d 125 (6th Cir. 1971); Hutchings v. United States Indus., Inc., 428 F.2d
303, 312 (5th Cir. 1970); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 715 (7th Cir. 1969).
" See Shiffer v. Board of Educ., 45 Mich. App. 190, 206 N.W.2d 250 (1973); Alberts
v. Garofalo, 393 Pa. 212, 142 A.2d 280 (1958).
"' COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-63-116 (1973).
" 522 P.2d at 733.
.. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-4-105(7) (1973) (for text of statute, see note 40 supra).
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Given the purpose of the hearing before the panel and the
fact that Umberfield's dismissal occurred subsequent to it, the
allegation of religious discrimination was not strongly asserted
before the panel."' The dismissal, which the panel found to be
justifiable under the Teacher Tenure Act,"' was a prerequisite to
a finding by the CCRC that a discriminatory employment prac-
tice in violation of the Antidiscrimination Act"7 had occurred.
Until the dismissal, Umberfield's complaint of discrimination
had not ripened.
In Tipler v. E.I. duPont deNemours, Inc.,' a case involving
discrimination which was prohibited by both the National Labor
Relations Act and Title VII, a claim was filed with both the
EEOC and the National Labor Relations Board. Even then it was
held that the NLRB hearing did not adequately consider the
factors necessary for a Title VII violation."' The court said that
[a]lthough these two acts [Title VII and the Labor Relations Act]
are not totally dissimilar, their differences significantly overshadow
their similarities. Absent a special consideration, a determination
arising solely under one statute should not automatically be binding
when a similar question arises under another statute. This is be-
cause the purposes, requirements, perspective and configuration of
different statutes ordinarily vary.'"
Drawing the obvious analogy between Tipler and Umberfield, it
is clear that the determination under the Teacher Tenure Act in
Umberfield should not preclude a determination by the CCRC.
The panel, unlike the CCRC, has no expertise in the area of
discriminatory employment practices and should therefore not be
accorded the role of making a final determination of any violation
of the Antidiscrimination Act which may have occurred.
2'
The Supreme Court has stated that the rights guaranteed by
Title VII, which are identical to those protected by Colorado's
statute, represent a strong statement of congressional intent that
" See note 43 supra.
. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-63-117 (1973).
"7 "It shall be a discriminatory or unfair employment practice: (a) For an employer
to . . . discharge . . . any person otherwise qualified because of ... creed. Id.
§ 24-34-306.
433 F.2d 125 (6th Cir. 1971).
"' Id. at 129.
jm Id. at 128. See also Lane v. Railroad Retirement Bd., 185 F.2d 819 (6th Cir. 1950);
DAVIS § 18.04, at 577. (Professor Davis states that one determination is not necessarily
binding when the same question arises under two statutes).
"I See 522 P.2d at 735 (Pringle, J., dissenting).
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"each employee [shall] be free from discriminatory practices."',
The Court has stressed that Congress felt that those rights are so
important that they not only provided the remedies available
under Title VII proceedings, but also provided that these reme-
dies "supplement, rather than supplant" existing remedies which
also forbid discriminatory practices. 2 '
CONCLUSION
Although the application of res judicata is appropriate in
many administrative law contexts, courts should apply it only
after a deliberate determination of its usefulness. It is not an
inflexible doctrine; courts should consider not only the essential
elements of same party, same claim, and final determination, but
also the theory, purpose, and intent behind the doctrine's use.
Once it has been determined that the factual situation before the
court meets the fundamental criteria for the application of res
judicata, the utility of applying the doctrine should be tested
against the elements of the analytical framework proposed in this
comment. All four issues should be analyzed in light of the facts
of the particular case, with any one of them potentially preclud-
ing a finding of res judicata.
In Umberfield the Colorado Supreme Court applied res judi-
cata in reaction to the potential problem of having to conform two
conflicting agency decisions. Failure to approach this issue of first
impression without careful analysis seriously limited the CCRC's
jurisdiction. It resulted in a denial of the CCRC's right to exercise
its expertise whenever the complainant had recourse to a prior
agency determination on any issue arising from the same set of
facts. In order to provide the CCRC with the authority and juris-
diction which it needs to effectively achieve its purpose, a reconsi-
deration of the question presented in Umberfield is imperative.
Sandy Gail Nyholm
122 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1974).
123 Id. at 48-49.
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